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Abstract: 
Hungary’s political backsliding, which has transformed it from a former frontrunner of liberal 
democracy in the post-communist region to an illiberal and/or authoritarian state, has puzzled 
political scientists. As a contribution to understanding the problem of Viktor Orbán’s 
leadership and the regime change, we apply Stephen Skowronek’s concept of ‘reconstructive 
leadership’. The politics of reconstruction, with an emphasis on the introduction of new 
standards of legitimacy, and the mobilization of support for new modes of governance, leaves 
ample room for appreciating the role of political leadership. Through an analysis of three 
policy areas (constitution-making, macroeconomic- and immigration policy) related to 
Orbán’s efforts at reconstruction, we argue that the Hungarian case underscores the formative 
role of agency even more than in Skowronek’s original conception. Reviewing some possible 
criticisms of Skowronek’s perspective and some recent literature about ‘discursive 
institutionalism’ we argue that the Hungarian case makes a vital correction to the 
Skowronekian concept, suggesting the value of taking a more constructivist approach. 
Keywords: reconstructive leadership, constructivism, discursive institutionalism, Hungarian 
politics, Viktor Orbán 
The political changes of recent years in Hungary have attracted significant international 
attention and raised questions about the relationship between the executive leadership and the 
political regime. The direction of the changes and the controversial leadership style of 
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán have puzzled political scientists. Is Hungary still a 
liberal democracy, or has it become a ‘hybrid regime’ (Wigell, 2008)? Or is the ‘Orbán-
phenomenon’ better regarded as a brand of populism (Enyedi, 2016a; Pappas, 2008)? 
Various explanations have evolved to account for this backslide. The critical elections and the 
partisan realignment theory (Enyedi and Benoit 2011; Róbert and Papp 2012) reveal the 
increased opportunity for political change, but do not explain its direction. The possibility of 
‘authoritarian diffusion’, that is the impact of Putin’s Russia is obviously raised, but political 
science research has found no empirical evidence for this phenomenon (Buzogány, 2017). 
Economic interest is considered as a variable – either as a pressure by the national capitalist 
class (Scheiring, 2015), or as the aim of the new ruling political elite to establish some version 
of ‘neoprebendial’ property relations with an increased Hungarian ownership share (Csillag and 
Szelényi, 2015). Populism as an ideology shared by Orbán and his entourage has also been 
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considered a prominent factor in the illiberal turn (Batory, 2015; Enyedi, 2016b; Pappas, 2014). 
A recently published study emphasises the role of agency in the process of democratic erosion, 
focusing on the partisan mobilisation strategy and on the agent-led process of cultural change 
(Herman, 2016). These explanations, however, do not seem to give a sufficient account of the 
speed, scope and depth of changes. 
In this article, we consider Viktor Orbán’s leadership as the main driving force of the changes 
in Hungary, applying Stephen Skowronek’s concept of ‘reconstructive leadership’ (Skowronek, 
1997). Skowronek’s concept of ‘political time’ posits that there are recurrent patterns in the 
histories of regimes. At the beginning of every political regime a reconstructive leader emerges 
to change the political settlement. This emphasis on recurrent elements in change contributes a 
new analytical perspective to mainstream interpretations, which are usually teleological, 
implicitly or explicitly accepting that history moves towards the global victory of liberal 
democracy (Fukuyama, 1989; Schedler, 1998; Wigell, 2008). Moreover, the concept of 
reconstruction, somewhat modified, creates room for better appreciating the role of political 
leadership. The introduction of new standards of legitimacy, the mobilisation of support for a 
new mode of governance, the speeding up or slowing down ‘political time’: these are all 
instruments that leaders can utilise, through discursive means, to fulfil their goals. 
Although Skowronek’s work is built on an examination of the US Constitution and Presidency, 
it also provides a basis for comparative research and a broad explanatory narrative for regime 
dynamics. The author’s theory has recently been explored as a suitable and fruitful model for 
application in parliamentary contexts as well (Byrne et al, 2017; Laing and McCaffrie, 2013; 
McCaffrie, 2012; ‘t Hart, 2011, 2014). Hence, the task of this paper is to engage in an 
intellectual enterprise of ‘conceptual traveling’ (Sartori, 1970). We claim that the concept of 
reconstructive leadership can help us understand the situation in Hungary. 
Beyond the aim of using a new perspective to examine recent Hungarian politics, the research 
described in this paper also has some theoretical ambitions. Based on criticisms directed at 
Skowronek’s concept (Arnold, 1995; Hoekstra, 1999), and the recent literature of ‘discursive 
institutionalism’ (Carstensen, 2015; Schmidt, 2008, 2010, 2011) the goal is to give an account 
of reconstruction that underscores the formative role of political leadership more strongly than 
in the original concept, and that can be described as ‘agency-centred constructivism’ (Widmaier 
et al., 2007). The Hungarian case, as we will argue, provides an expressive illustration of such 
an agent-centred (although not necessarily voluntarist) view of reconstruction. 
The paper consists of three parts. In the first section (1), we sketch out Skowronek’s concepts 
of regime and reconstructive leadership, and review some possible criticisms of these views 
which serve as a theoretical starting point for our more agent-centred view. In the second part 
(2) we analyse three specific policy areas in which Orbán’s reconstruction took place: the 
heterodox economic policy pursued by his governments, the drafting of Hungary’s new 
constitution, and Hungarian immigration policy during the refugee crisis (from 2015 onwards). 
Analysis of each of these areas supplies us with important information about the aims and 
means of Orbán’s reconstruction. In part three (3) we discuss the theoretical implications of the 
empirical analysis, reflecting on how the Hungarian case supports a more consistently 
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constructivist approach, and on the differences between Skowronek’s original, American case 
and the Hungarian one. 
Political leadership and regime change 
Executive leadership involves both the destruction and construction of elements of the political 
environment. As primary agents of change, all leaders attempt to control these forces to make 
the changes they desire, but very few make significant transformations. Stephen Skowronek 
(1997, 2011) systematically analyses the relationship between the capacities of leaders and 
broader economic and social changes through patterns of US presidential behaviour. In his 
contextual/situational analysis, similarities with leadership recur throughout the ‘political time’ 
that leaders find themselves in. In this sense, effective leadership depends not only on personal 
ability and ambitions, but also on the actual state of the prevailing political regime. The political 
identity of incumbents may either be oppositional or supportive of a regime; previously 
established commitments and values determine leaders’ modes of leadership. When a regime 
is resilient, the opportunities of leaders opposed to it are limited. In contrast, when a regime is 
vulnerable, the political establishment is unable to resolve emerging problems and crisis, and 
consequently loses public support (in the form of credibility and legitimacy). This political 
environment creates greater space for oppositional leaders to gain authority and recreate 
political order in their own favour. Thus, the success or failure of leaders is significantly 
dependent on how strongly they resonate with the political milieu in which they operate. 
In Skowronek’s work, the term ‘political regime’ is used both as a narrower and a broader 
concept than the formal constitutional traits and institutional arrangements of government. It is 
narrower in the sense that ‘the American Constitution has endured not as a single governmental 
formation but as a succession of relatively distinctive political regimes, each of which has 
substantially altered the substantive content and practical operations of federalism and the 
separation of powers’, as Orren and Skowronek (1998: 690) claim. Yet Skowronek’s concept 
of regime, from another perspective, is much broader than ‘constitutional setting’ since it 
includes style of governance, the way power is exercised, the pattern of relationships between 
state and society (for example, in the form of the borders between them), the underlying political 
and social coalitions (elite arrangements, inter- or intra-party coalitions, electoral /re/alignment, 
and so on) and the political discourse which legitimises it. It also embraces a central idea about 
policy (or policy paradigm); that it constitutes ‘the governing orthodoxy of the day’ (’t Hart, 
2014: 216) which is regarded as appropriate for solving the problems of the age by the political 
and social coalition which supports the regime (see for example McKay, 2014: 446–447). To 
sum up: regimes are ‘sets of basic values, ideas and policy propensities around which the polity 
and its governance are organised’, as ‘t Hart states (2011: 426). In Skowronek’s concept of 
political time, the trajectory of each regime leads from a ‘founding’ stage of shorter or longer 
duration to a stage of crisis or disintegration. The political ‘opportunity structure’ of leaders 
depends significantly on their relationship to the regime, as well as on the stage of the regime 
on its life-trajectory.  
Skowronek (1997: 36–45) categorises presidential political identities in relation to the different 
statuses of regimes (Table 1), thereby creating a typology. In the politics of articulation, 
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presidents are affiliated and committed to implementing a resilient set of governmental 
priorities (for example, Theodore Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson). Limiting the potentially 
disruptive effects of leadership, they seek to maintain and strengthen the status-quo. As 
‘orthodox-innovators’ they are forced to rearticulate the regime in a new and more relevant 
form to demonstrate the flexibility of government in a changing time. In contrast, leaders who 
come to office affiliated with a failing regime constitute the politics of disjunction (for example, 
Herbert Hoover and Jimmy Carter). These leaders fail to respond to the problems of the day 
and are thus unable to maintain the political order. Presidents who are opposed to a resilient 
regime may become trapped in the politics of pre-emption (for example, Woodrow Wilson and 
Richard Nixon). Although they try to challenge the prevailing political order, their leadership 
is restricted by a politically, institutionally, and ideologically well supported establishment. 
Table 1. Recurrent Patterns of Executive Leadership 
Previously 
established 
commitments 
President’s political identity 
Affiliated Oppositional 
Resilient Politics of articulation Politics of pre-emption 
Vulnerable Politics of disjunction Politics of reconstruction 
Source: Skowronek, 1997: 36 (slightly modified) 
Finally, the politics of reconstruction offers presidents who are opposed to a vulnerable regime 
the greatest license for change as the founders of a new regime (for example, Abraham Lincoln 
and Franklin D. Roosevelt). Due to their convincing definitions and posited solutions to pre-
existing problems and crises, reconstructive leaders are able to take advantage of widespread 
electoral discontent with the establishment. The subsequently new arrangements afford leaders 
the capacity to establish entirely new standards for legitimate action. 
Skowronek (1997: 19–23, 37; 2004) distinguishes three, mutually reinforcing components of 
reconstructive leadership. First, order-shattering refers to the destruction of previously 
established arrangements through the exercise of power of office. Reconstructive leaders use 
their inherently disruptive power consciously to repudiate old governing formulas and to create 
space and the need for replacements. Second, order-affirming connects leadership to the 
community and its values. Destructive action must be justified by emphasising the protection 
and preservation of values identified by the community which have been lost in the past. 
Finally, order-creating clears the space for reconstructive leaders to innovate. In the politics of 
reconstruction, the opportunity space is wider than at any other phase of the political time, 
although the new standards for action must stand the test of legitimacy in relation to the leaders’ 
narrative and definition of the given situation. In this sense, success with ‘order-creating’ 
depends on how well reconstructive leaders are able to resolve the problem of legitimacy by 
reconciling the destructive and constructive forces of their office. This theory highlights the 
fact that Skowronek has created not only a contextual/situational understanding of executive 
leadership, but one with a constructivist perspective, although it is debatable how much room 
it truly leaves for political leaders to change their environment and to alter political time. The 
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following review of some potential critiques of the theory enables us to move the original 
concept in a more constructivist direction. 
A constructivist reading of Skowronek’s theory 
Peri E. Arnold raised the question of determinism about the affiliated roles in the Skowronekian 
‘recurrent patterns’, asking if they leave enough room for leaders to make a difference (Arnold, 
1995: 508)? Douglas J. Hoekstra’s critique (1999) is even wider in scope: it highlights the fact 
that the resilience / vulnerability dimension in Skowronek’s theoretical conception tends to 
eclipse an important problem about the state of a regime, namely, that it is never completely 
clear whether a regime is resilient or vulnerable. Leaders are ‘surrounded by varied 
contemporary interpretations of their own political environments, interpretations from which 
they must choose, experimentally testing the extent to which the stances chosen will produce 
desired outcomes’ (Hoekstra, 1999: 661). What might seem retrospectively to be clear evidence 
of resilience may be contestable from the perspective of prospective leadership. Therefore, 
Skowronek’s account is deemed guilty of engaging in ‘ambivalent determinism’, according to 
Hoekstra (1999: 660): while Skowronek grants actors freedom within each unit of political time, 
he fails to acknowledge that actors can change the natural flow of time and thus can move 
across stages.  
Although Hoekstra’s remarks on determinism may seem too stern in the light of Skowronek’s 
recent work (see for example Skowronek, 2011: 167–194), he captures well some of the 
conceptual lacunae in the Skowronekian theory of reconstruction. The nature of regime 
vulnerability and the exact role of political agency in bringing about change need further 
conceptualisation. In the recent literatures on the American political development, we find at 
least two ways to fill this conceptual void. The first is to take a look at the larger, more systemic 
patterns of the polity (for example: the loss of coalitional cohesion, the weakening efficacy of 
institutional arrangements) surrounding reconstruction (Nichols and Myers, 2010). The main 
merit of this view is that, by describing certain ‘reconstructive tasks’, it provides leverage to 
differentiate between successful and unsuccessful reconstructions. However, by introducing the 
concept of ‘enervation’ instead of ‘vulnerability’ it draws close to the deterministic position 
described by Hoekstra above, because enervation implies ‘a necessary reordering once the 
political system has entered a high entropy state’ (Nichols and Myers, 2010: 813 – emphasis 
added). The second way is to lay greater emphasis on entrepreneurial leaders and the discursive 
means used by their leadership (Polsky, 2012). Emphasising the role of political entrepreneurs 
in forming citizens’ perceptions about events may transform the somewhat ambivalent 
Skowronekian concept of reconstruction into a more constructivist theory. However, the 
constructivist perspective presented by Polsky still needs further elaboration, which he himself 
also acknowledges (Polsky, 2012: 80). 
 
To underscore further the role of agency and political discourse, the Skowronekian view may 
be situated within contemporary new institutionalist debates. A tendency to overemphasise path 
dependencies and unconscious or exogenous processes of change is often ascribed to historical 
institutionalism (which Skowronek’s work comes close to admitting). In this logic, periods of 
Accepted version (13 April 2018) 
6 
 
path-dependency are interrupted by exogenous shocks, which serve to explain changes. This 
‘static’ view of change has recently been criticised by proponents of discursive and 
constructivist institutionalism (Carstensen, 2011a; Hay, 2011; Schmidt, 2010, 2011; Béland and 
Cox, 2011). While not denying that ‘stuff happens’ (that is, there exist exogenous and 
unconscious sources of change), discursive institutionalism ‘shows that much change can and 
should be explained in terms of sentient agents’ ideas about what to change (or continue) – if 
nothing else, in response to occurrences on the outside, that is, to the stuff that happens’ 
(Schmidt, 2010: 13 – emphasis added). These ideas are manifested in discourse, which has the 
capacity to challenge existing institutional and ideational patterns. Therefore, political actors 
can play a more formative role in change through discursive means.  
The main point of the discursive institutionalists, that political agents are able to criticise 
institutional logics and ideational orthodoxies with their ‘foreground discursive abilities’ 
(Schmidt, 2008), may be seen as a vital correction of the Skowronekian picture. Although ideas 
and institutions can create path-dependency, political agents also have the opportunity to 
redefine those ideas and institutional logics by coupling them with others (Carstensen, 2011b; 
Carstensen, 2015), or by borrowing elements from alternative ideational sets to create some 
kind of ‘bricolage’ (Carstensen, 2011a). Bringing in insights from discursive institutionalism 
may enable us to appreciate better the role of discourse and the mechanisms through which it 
effects change. Elaborating on these features can be considered as a refinement of Polsky’s 
claim that ‘prospective regime creators engage in a discursive project’ (Polsky, 2012: 62) by 
giving us a more detailed picture of how that project is carried out. In addition, by emphasising 
the role of ideological flexibility, we show that events empower stories (Polsky, 2012: 64), and 
that narratives operating with generic terms or ‘empty signifiers’ (Laclau, 2005; Schmidt, 2017) 
can more easily accommodate changing circumstances, which is vital for their success. As a 
third addition, we seek to identify some other types of the constraints to the formative power of 
discourse than those listed by Polsky (Cook and Polsky, 2005; Polsky, 2012). 
In this paper, we seek to modify Skowronek’s concept along these lines. Analysis of the case 
of political changes in Hungary is helpful in this theoretical endeavour as it provides a forceful 
illustration of the power of agency to bring about the need for regime change through the 
creation of a robust legitimating discourse. What follows from this analysis is the recognition 
that a more constructivist approach may yield additional insights into the mechanisms of regime 
change.1 However, adopting a constructivist viewpoint does not entail the elimination of the 
resilience – vulnerability dimension, because the conditions that make regime change possible 
can be conceived of in constructivist terms, be they changes in public opinion, the weakening 
appeal of rival narratives in the discursive struggle, or the weakening of elite commitments 
towards certain goals. However, we argue that these changes do not necessarily translate into 
any form of regime crisis; in themselves they do not turn the political settlement into an 
‘enervated’ regime (compare with Nichols and Myers, 2010). Sometimes, it is the task of 
leaders to channel responses to such phenomena into change through their action and discourse, 
to translate fuzzy, diffuse forms of popular dissatisfaction into a wish for certain concrete and 
fundamental changes – or at least to secure the passive permission of citizens for these changes 
by satisficing their discontent with symbolic gestures. In short: the vulnerability of an existing 
regime has to be manufactured. 
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On the other hand, regime change cannot succeed on completely voluntaristic grounds: the 
political leader can give more definite contours to popular opinions, but this possibility does 
not mean that the leader’s opinion is the only game in town. Existing commitments, institutional 
logics, rival narratives, and others naturally constrain the voluntarism of political leaders. 
Therefore, an additional and important task of the constructivist approach is to map these 
external factors. 
Viktor Orbán’s reconstructive leadership 
The Hungarian transition to democracy in 1989-90 was a system change that also involved a 
regime change. The newly shaped post-communist regime lasted for two decades until Orbán’s 
post-2010 reconstruction put an end to it. Orbán recurrently expressed his dissatisfaction with 
the post-1990 settlement as early as his first premiership (1998-2002) (Janke, 2015), blaming 
the 1989-90 transition for failing to depose the communist ‘nomenklatura’ elite, and often 
characterising his politics as a fight against ‘post-communism’. However, his struggle to change 
the regime remained largely unsuccessful in terms of changing power relations in the cultural 
or economic sphere, or in the media.  
The post-communist regime became more vulnerable after 2006 for various reasons. A leaked 
speech in which socialist PM Ferenc Gyurcsány admitted to lying during the electoral 
campaign, the cabinet’s austerity measures, the recurrent corruption scandals surrounding the 
government, and the global financial crisis which started in the autumn of 2008 eroded popular 
support for the ruling socialist-liberal coalition. Gyurcsány tried to keep the system going 
through borrowing from the IMF and by introducing new austerity measures, but he lost his 
‘control over the political definition of the situation’ (Skowronek, 1993: 40). Orbán and his 
then-opposition party, the Fidesz-KDNP alliance, contributed effectively to weakening the 
legitimacy of the regime through promoting a persuasive narrative of crisis, and pushing 
through the 2008 referendum which vetoed Gyurcsány’s neoliberal policy reforms 
(introduction of co-payment in health service and tuition fee in higher education). Gyurcsány 
lost his struggle for credibility, and in 2009 he was replaced by Gordon Bajnai as Prime 
Minister. The technocratic image of the Bajnai-cabinet (McDonnell and Valbruzzi, 2014) 
recalls Skowronek’s view, that ‘only technocratic warrants are available for disjunctive 
presidents’ (Byrne et al, 2017: 211). To sum up: the premiership of Gyurcsány (2006-2009) and 
his successor Gordon Bajnai (2009-2010) can be described as the politics of disjunction. 
Following the change in citizens’ party preferences, the Hungarian party system, formerly 
composed of two poles of nearly equal strength, collapsed: in the 2010 elections, Fidesz-KDNP 
gained an unprecedented two-thirds majority in parliament. Orbán could rely on Fidesz-KDNP, 
his hierarchically organised and hyper-centralised party, that he has been leading since 2003 
unchallenged, and also on the loyal and disciplined parliamentary group of his party (Janke, 
2015). These factors gave Orbán the opportunity to bring in ‘heterodox’ policy measures and 
found a new regime, and reconstruct even the whole constitutional settlement, as described 
below.  
 
Macroeconomic policy 
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Order-shattering. Conflicts of authority are part of both the Skowronekian process of regime 
change and changes in policy paradigms.2 However, the battlefield in which these conflicts are 
resolved is that of social construction. Just as the vulnerability of a regime is not self-evident, 
economic anomalies in themselves do not lead to the questioning of old paradigms. Rather, ‘it 
is politics, not economics, and it is authority, not facts, that matter for both paradigm 
maintenance and change’ (Blyth, 2013: 210). The Orbán governments after 2010 tried to 
interpret economic anomalies as signs of the systemic failure of the old neoliberal 
macroeconomic paradigm, leading to authority conflicts with both internal (the Hungarian 
National Bank) and external (the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank) 
actors. 
As recent literature suggests (in contrast to the earlier posited ‘no change’ thesis), the 
macroeconomic mainstream itself underwent incremental change during the international 
financial crisis and the resultant Great Recession (Baker and Underhill, 2015; Moschella, 2015). 
However, we suggest that the changes introduced by the Orbán governments were more far-
reaching and radical than these corrections required. For example, the government introduced 
‘crisis taxes’ to widen its fiscal room for manoeuvre: most notably, a tax on banks that was (in 
international comparison) unique in its size, calculation basis (total assets instead of profits), 
and ex post facto nature, and served as a tool with which to reduce the budget deficit, instead 
of stabilising the banking system (Várhegyi, 2012: 223–224; Voszka, 2013: 1293–1294). Other 
sectors such as telecommunications, advertising and energy were also subject to such taxation. 
These crisis taxes were among the main triggers of the authority conflicts with the IMF, the 
European Commission, and with the Hungarian National Bank (the latter only until early 2013, 
when new, government-friendly leadership was parachuted in).  
Orbán used a framing narrative of crisis to translate such measures into more everyday terms, 
interpreting the scope of the crisis in a much wider way than suggested by economic authorities 
(Illés, 2016). For him, the global financial crisis was the symptom of a civilisational crisis, ‘the 
fall of scientific capitalism’ (Orbán, 2010a). He continued by saying that this crisis had 
destroyed all orientation points and role models, so a new beginning was necessary; one which 
could only be revealed through trial-and-error, not economic theory (Orbán, 2011a). The 
appropriate alternative to ‘scientific capitalism’ was said to be the ‘workfare state’, 
characterised as an ‘illiberal state’ in his controversial 2014 speech given at Tusnádfürdő 
(Orbán, 2014). It is within this broader narrative-ideational framework that Orbán framed the 
need to modify earlier macroeconomic policy. 
Order-affirming. Orbán’s discursive strategy of raising specific policy problems to a more 
general level, while at the same time dramatising them and making them more easily 
comprehensible, is a central part of the order-affirming method of his reconstruction. Specific 
technical policy problems thereby become attached to general normative concepts such as 
‘independence’, ‘liberty’ and ‘sovereignty’. One method of legitimation Orbán often uses is to 
connect the action of his government to the Hungarian freedom fights of 1848-49 (against the 
Habsburgs) and 1956 (against the Soviets). The foreign power in the current scenario is most 
often ‘Brussels’, which is sometimes explicitly compared to ‘Vienna and Moscow’ (Orbán, 
2011b). A second ploy often used by Orbán is to appeal directly to individuals’ ‘sense of 
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justice’. Orbán speaks a ‘neoconservative political language’ (Szűcs, 2006) which employs 
easily understandable formulations and references to unchanging moral values and which 
contrasts strikingly with the rather technocratic discourse of the Hungarian Left. Using 
Schmidt’s categories (Schmidt, 2014), we claim that while the latter mainly use cognitive 
arguments (for example, economic necessity and efficiency) to legitimise their policies, the 
former usually resorts to normative arguments to obtain support for their more heterodox 
policies. 
Order-creating. Economic heterodoxy refers to a mix of unconventional and orthodox 
measures.3 Here, we emphasise four characteristics of the new, heterodox economic order.  
The first is its remarkable ideological flexibility. The best example of this flexibility  involves 
fiscal rigour. After winning the election in 2010, Orbán pleaded for a relaxation of fiscal targets 
in Brussels, but was declined. Following this rejection, he founded an ideological campaign to 
‘fight against the national debt’ (of which fiscal restrictions were considered an important part), 
connecting it to the notions of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘independence’, claiming that ‘a nation can be 
subjugated in two ways: either with a sword or with debt’ (Orbán, 2011b). Orbán’s turn is a 
good example of how agency can change the meaning of ideas by connecting them to others 
(Carstensen, 2015). 
The second important feature of the new macroeconomic policy is that although the related 
measures often seem consonant with Western trends, this similarity is usually deceptive.  For 
example, the expansion of state ownership in Hungary differs from its Western counterpart in 
terms of the scale of sectors affected (which includes the transport, automotive, and 
telecommunications sectors and public works), the occasional use of direct or indirect pressure 
on owners to sell company shares, and the aims (Voszka, 2015). An economically activist state 
has been a cornerstone of Orbán’s political discourse since at least 2010. In his opinion, only 
such a state can enforce the public interest against private interests (Orbán, 2010b), and 
guarantee the primacy of the national interest against the ‘supranational elite’: ‘A country the 
size of Hungary – not the size of Germany or the United States, but similar in size to us – can 
only be strong if there is robust majority national ownership in the strategic industries which 
determine its fate.’ (Orbán, 2017).   
A third, related feature is the goal of building an economic coalition that supports the new 
regime (Orbán, 2017). For this reason, the Orbán governments created circumstances that in 
certain respects resemble ‘neoprebendial’ relations (Csillag and Szelényi, 2015): the resource 
redistributed to political loyalists is not private property, but rather takes the form of licences 
and public procurements. The receivers may be loyal oligarchs (for example, in the media), or 
minor players (for example, in the case of the introduction of a state monopoly and distribution 
of new licences for tobacco sales). 
Fourth, heterodox policies in some cases were a partial response to electoral attitudes. The 
second Orbán government succeeded in boosting its popularity at the time of reducing domestic 
utility costs and thematising the topic in the media (Böcskei, 2016), repeatedly emphasising  
that the state ownership of public works was a prerequisite for these reductions. 
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To sum up: while some elements of the mainstream macroeconomic paradigm were called into 
question during and after the global financial crisis in Europe and the USA, the mainstream 
opinion was not that the role of the state needed to be fundamentally reinterpreted. Neither was 
the scale nor the practice of ‘emergency taxation’ in Hungary consonant with international 
trends, because the aim of these measures was different: they were implemented to widen fiscal 
room for manoeuvre and support the building of a new regime. To use Blyth’s categories (Blyth, 
2013), these changes did not involve the Bayesian logic of social learning, but were rather 
constructivist in nature; Hungary’s economic problems being a political construct. With his 
powerful narrative of crisis, Orbán tried to construe the Western model of ‘scientific capitalism’ 
as a failure, and thereby instrumentalise the crisis to further more etatist political projects.  
Constitution-building 
The post-2010 constitution-making was neither a consequence of a manifest constitutional-
crisis, nor was it due to the ‘exigency of constitution-making’ as a consequence of an external 
shock, but it was rather a clear example of political agency and part of Orbán’s political 
endeavour to found a new regime (Körösényi et al., 2016). Since the 2006 political crisis the 
legitimacy of the constitution has been undermined on the right of the political spectrum, but 
constitutional issues have remained marginal in political discourse. However, Orbán has turned 
his landslide victory in 2010 and the accompanying constitutional supermajority in parliament 
into a ‘constitutional moment’. He has successfully integrated concerns with the legitimacy of 
the constitution into a wider discourse of crisis, framing the codification of the new constitution 
as a symbolic issue in the regime change (compare with Boin et al., 2008).  
Order-shattering. Orbán’s aims with constitution-making were multiple. First, the new 
constitution became a symbolic expression of revolutionary change and the founding moment 
of a new regime (The Fundamental Law). Dramatisation of the break with the post-communist 
regime has been reinforced by a series of conceptual and symbolic gestures, such as renaming 
the constitution as ‘Fundamental Law’, incorporating the Hungarian ‘Holy Crown’ into the 
constitution, and eliminating ‘Republic’ from the official name of the state. Second, in a 
substantive sense, it represented a break with the ‘legal constitutionalist’ (Bellamy, 2007) 
approach which had characterised the previous regime  and supported the supremacy of judicial 
review over politics. Like the Supreme Court for Franklin D. Roosevelt, Orbán regarded the 
Constitutional Court as the key stronghold of the previous regime, which indeed turned out to 
be the major counter-power vis-a-vis his political and legislative programme. Third, 
constitution-making became Orbán’s means of weakening and de-legitimising authorities 
which were interwoven with the status quo, such as the constitutional court itself, the 
‘ombudsman’, media authorities, and the central bank. The process lasted from 2010 to 2015, 
involving a few crucial constitutional amendments before and after the ceremonial introduction 
of the Fundamental Law which became an essential part of the political struggle between 
Orbán’s political majority and the constitutional forces representing the status quo, including 
the parliamentary opposition, the Constitutional Court, NGOs and prominent constitutional 
lawyers. Clashes with international actors such as the EU Commission, the European 
Parliament, the Venice Commission, and the US government, who all expressed concern about 
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certain changes in the constitution, were perceived and framed in Orbán’s political discourse as 
part of his cabinet’s ‘freedom fight’ to regain Hungarian national sovereignty.  
Order-affirming. Orbán’s constitution-building efforts were also designed to re-confirm some 
of the common values and constitutional traditions shared by the community in the past, or 
which he sought to create anew through the new constitution. First, the Preamble (National 
Avowal) of the 2011 Fundamental Law, as well as the constitutional discourse of Fidesz-
KDNP, recalled the Christian and national traditions that were prevalent in Hungary prior to 
the communist era. The Preamble emphasises these traditions and the honouring of ‘the Holy 
Crown, which embodies the constitutional continuity of Hungary’s statehood and the unity of 
the nation’ (The Fundamental Law). Second, the Hungarian nation is defined in an ethnocentric 
way in the Fundamental Law, which not only embraces symbolically the ethnic Hungarians of 
neighbouring countries in the constitution, but enfranchises them to participate in Hungarian 
general elections through a newly introduced dual citizenship scheme. 
Order-creating. Regime foundation, according to Skowronek, does not necessarily include any 
formal constitution-making (Orren and Skowronek, 1998). However, Orbán made his new 
regime more robust with the new Fundamental Law, which was presented in his political 
discourse as the codification of a ‘new social contract’ emerging from the 2010 ‘revolution in 
the polling booth’ and from the National Consultation with the people (Orbán 2013a). A few 
features of the new regime were manifested by the change of emphasis and priority among 
constitutional values, as well as some institutional restructuring. As far as fundamental rights 
are concerned, there was a shift away from liberal individualism in a more collectivist direction, 
as Orbán explored in his 2013 Bálványos speech. He emphasised that ‘[t]he new Fundamental 
Law, unlike liberal constitutions that defines exclusively rights and liberties, became a national 
constitution, which is based on liberties, but it wants to keep an equilibrium between rights and 
obligations’ (Orbán 2013b). Regarding public law, there has been a certain refurbishment of 
the major constitutional powers and institutions, which has strengthened the power of the office 
of Prime Minister and the parliamentary majority and added to the hyper-centralisation of state 
administration.  
Although the Orbán-regime is distinguished mostly by its new patterns of power-wielding and 
the accompanied legitimacy discourse, constitution-making has refurbished the power 
structure, reinforced Orbán’s reconstructive leadership, and highlighted the symbolic caesura 
during the change of political times. Moreover, Orbán’s constitution-making underlines both 
Skowronek’s thesis about the necessarily divisive nature of reconstructive leadership, and also 
the fact that diffuse support for Orbán’s policy in general has created significant autonomy for 
leadership in less salient policy fields such as constitutional issues. In spite of the concern of 
the domestic political and professional elite and international authorities, most Hungarians gave 
tacit consent to the constitution-making, meaning that the legitimacy discourse of Fidesz-
KDNP was rather efficient. As a result, the combination of Orbán’s discursive power and his 
disciplined parliamentary supermajority produced a rather voluntarist constitutional policy: de 
facto, he was able to pass all desired constitutional amendments between 2010 and 2015. 
However, after the loss of the party’s supermajority, in 2015 compromise with some of the 
parliamentary opposition again became a serious constraint, as the failure of the scheduled 
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amendment in 2016, which would have prevented the application of resettlement quotas 
scheduled by the EU demonstrates.   
Migration policy 
Order-shattering. Some critical elements of Orbán’s reconstructive politics such as the new 
Fundamental Law, the constitutional amendments and extensive media legislation (Sonnevend 
et al., 2015) came under constant attack from the EU. Thus, the need to redefine the regime’s 
relationship with the European Union became critical. The ’old order’ was based on the 
normative power of the EU (Pace, 2007), which focuses on promoting the values of liberal 
democracy (rule of law, human rights, and social justice). It determined the EU-related affairs 
of the countries, such as the migration policy, which is fundamentally and prominently built on 
these principles (Boswell, 2000). In 2015, the migration crisis provided an opportunity for 
Orbán to disrupt this governing formula by weakening the EU’s normative power, as 
represented by Angela Merkel and Jean-Claude Junker’s moral leadership (Radu, 2016), and to 
strengthen domestically as well as internationally the regime vis-a-vis the EU. In short, the issue 
of migration was important in Orbán’s reconstruction because of the potential for conflict. 
The migration crisis became much more pronounced than the sudden increase in the number of 
refugees and migrants would have warranted. Dysfunctional European crisis management and 
the series of terrorist attacks and other related incidents provided more space for Orbán to form 
a securitisation narrative of immigration (Huysmans, 2000; Szalai and Gőbl, 2015) in order to 
shatter the prevailing order. Through populist rhetoric, Orbán consequently raised the stakes of 
the crisis, making a clear connection between illegal immigration, organised crime, and 
terrorism. Initially, his crisis narrative (Metz, 2017) built on the impact of immigration on the 
economy, culture, and public safety; then in time it focused more on the lack of confidence, 
leadership, and democracy in the EU, and the collapse of a European Christian identity. In 
addition he strongly opposed the European liberal and left-wing political elite (‘Brusselian 
bureaucrats’) and civil activists. To support this narrative, Orbán initiated legal action against 
the EU’s migrant resettlement quota plan at the European Court of Justice in December 2015, 
along with Slovakia, claiming that the decision infringed EU law. 
In the domestic arena, Orbán put great emphasis on dominating public discourse and applied a 
plebiscitary strategy to support his messages. On 24 April 2015, the government launched a 
‘national consultation’ regarding the migrant crisis. This suggestive political questionnaire, 
mailed out to citizens, involved issues such as terrorism, the economic impacts of immigration 
and the incompetent politics of the EU, and resulted in the government raising the terror threat 
level. To legitimate its anti-immigration policy, the government also initiated a referendum 
about the EU’s compulsory migrant resettlement quotas which was held on 2 October 2016. 
The low turnout resulted in the invalidation of the referendum, although the overwhelming 
majority of voters rejected the EU proposal for a migrant quota.4 
Order-affirming. Orbán interpreted the migration crisis as an enormous threat, not just against 
the welfare state and public security, but also against Christian civilisation, European values, 
and nation states. One of the messages on a government billboard during a period of 
campaigning made his standpoint clear: ‘If you come to Hungary, respect our culture!’ Orbán’s 
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reconstructive leadership rested heavily on a process of collective identity-building.5 He 
provided a strong vision of a Christian Europe, contrasting this vision with Islamic culture, and 
consciously promoted his own role as defender of the Schengen area borders, of ‘old Europe’ 
and ‘real’ European values.  
Order-creating. In Orbán’s vision, there was no need for the further integration of immigration 
policy, because only nation states were able to manage the crisis effectively. However, he not 
only re-evaluated the EU affairs of the country, but also created wide public support for his 
policies. In other words, Orbán used the migration crisis to redefine and revitalise the role of 
nation states. 
The Hungarian PM showed strong leadership by responding quickly and effectively to the 
crisis. For a couple of weeks in 2015, hundreds of thousands of uncontrolled migrants marched 
through Hungary, and violent incidents occurred at the country’s southern border, as well as at 
Budapest’s main railway station. Orbán dramatised the events further in spite of the fact that 
the migrants were heading towards Germany and other western and northern European 
countries. On June 17, 2015 the government announced the construction of a fence along the 
Serbian border. At the end of that year, Hungary closed its ‘green’ border with Croatia as well. 
After a huge wave of criticism on Hungary, many countries such as Austria, Slovenia, Bulgaria 
and Croatia also erected border fences. Meanwhile, the Hungarian Parliament tightened the 
legal framework for asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants. On 7 June 2016, the governing 
alliance of Fidesz-KDNP and the right-wing opposition Jobbik approved the Sixth Amendment 
to the Fundamental Law, which widened the government’s emergency powers in the case of 
significant and direct risk of terrorist attack.6 After the invalid referendum of October 2016, 
Orbán submitted another amendment to prevent the imposition of compulsory resettlement 
quotas, but the proposal failed because it lacked the necessary majority. 
Orbán’s reconstructive leadership had successfully influenced public opinion. Since autumn 
2014 the issue of migration became increasingly important in national and EU politics.7 
Simultaneously, trust and positive attitudes toward the EU decreased significantly among 
Hungarians,8 while by 2016 xenophobia in Hungary had reached a record high (Simonovits and 
Bernát, 2016). Measures applied by the government, such as closing the southern borders 
(Medián, 2015; Nézőpont Intézet, 2015; Századvég, 2015a), and tightening immigration laws 
(Medián, 2015; Századvég, 2015b), had broad cross-party support. Overall, this situation 
indicates how Orbán was able to strengthen his position and regime vis-a-vis the normative 
power of the EU to a certain extent, but also that his policy choices were domestically 
constrained – as the unsuccessful referendum of October 2016 demonstrated. 
Discussion 
The Hungarian case raises three theoretical questions: (1) In what sense is constructivism a 
more important factor than one may think reading Skowronek? (2) Which factors limit the 
opportunities of leaders to interpret the situation (that is, how does our picture of these changes 
avoid the label voluntarism?). Finally (3), what are the most important contextual differences 
between the American case (as described by Skowronek) and the Hungarian case? 
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First, as the Hungarian case suggests, the vulnerability of the old regime was not self-evident. 
That means that it was not only the content of the change that depended on political leadership 
– as Skowronekian theory implies – but that the need for regime change itself was construed by 
political leadership. Orbán translated certain elements of popular dissatisfaction and wants into 
a desire for regime change. 
• Macroeconomic policy. Orbán’s interpretation that the recent financial crisis involved the 
‘failure of scientific capitalism’ was renegade rather than mainstream. This crisis narrative 
was instrumental in legitimising the unique measures that sufficiently widened the 
government’s fiscal room for manoeuvre (‘crisis taxes’, the ‘nationalisation’ of private 
pension funds, and so on), and for building up an economic coalition to support the new 
regime. An increase in the role of state ownership was communicated as a prerequisite for 
satisficing the popular demand for a decrease in utility bills. This scenario shows how the 
nature of Hungary’s economic problems were debatable, and that Orbán was required to 
engage in an extensive discursive struggle to legitimate his more etatist vision of 
capitalism.  
• Constitution-building. Although Orbán’s party gained a two-thirds, constitution-making  
majority at the 2010 elections, opinion polls showed that in the period prior to the remaking 
of the constitution, less than one third of the Hungarian population saw the need for a new 
constitution (Medián, 2011). However, Orbán’s constitutional discourse successfully 
connected the new constitution to his general narrative of post-communist regime change 
triggered by a ‘revolution in the polling-booth’. The low salience of constitutional matters 
to the Hungarian population made his task easier, and the repeated electoral victories of 
Fidesz-KDNP in 2014 signalled implicit or tacit popular approval for constitutional change. 
• Migration policy. Constant criticism of his regime-building strengthened Orbán’s 
Eurosceptic position and his ‘freedom fight’ against the EU. The PM dramatised migration 
as a threatening phenomenon and built up an impressive narrative of crisis, along with a 
widespread campaign that not only questioned the wisdom of a common migrant policy, 
but also undermined the normative power of the EU and redefined Hungary’s relationship 
with the EU. 
The second question posed above concerns the problem of voluntarism. Maintaining a focus on 
the changes brought about by agents and on the content of political discourse can easily lead 
the researcher to fail to observe structural constraints on action (Schmidt, 2010: 60; Hay, 2011: 
68–69). Our three examples indicate that if Orbán’s reconstruction was indeed voluntarist, this 
voluntarism was contingent: in some issues salient to the population the government attempted 
to be responsive, or backed down after witnessing the unpopularity of its measures. So, although 
internal ‘institutional friction’ (Orren and Skowronek, 1994) – understood in a narrow sense as 
a clash between formal institutions – was mainly of secondary importance, the attitudes of the 
Hungarian population, international institutions, and the ‘brute facts’ of reality created effective 
structural constraints on government agency.  
• Economic heterodoxy. Regarding macroeconomic policy, two factors should be mentioned. 
The first one is again international institutional pressure, this time from the European 
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Commission and IMF, with a view to enforcing fiscal rigor. The second factor is the 
attitude of the Hungarian electorate. The case of a decrease in utility bills following the 
monitoring of popular attitudes has already been mentioned. A second example is when 
the government withdrew legislation designed to force stores to close on Sundays, also in 
response to popular attitudes – the perceived unpopularity of the measure led the 
government to undertake ex post facto action.  
• Constitution-building. The constitution-making of Fidesz-KDNP appears to be the most 
voluntarist activity. This is because besides the two-thirds parliamentary majority 
threshold, there were no other effective constraints built into the pre-2010 political 
settlement. The only somewhat effective formal institutional constraint on the government 
was pressure from international institutions (for example, the European Central Bank, and 
the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe), which pressure led to several changes 
being made to the constitution.  
• Migration policy. Limits to social construction may be equivalent to Searle’s ‘brute’ facts, 
which are distinguishable from institutional facts (Searle, 1995, 2010). The latter are 
dependent on human agreement, while the former are not. In this sense, the migration 
narrative of the government perhaps lacked the ‘brute’ ground: a near-total absence of 
refugees who desired to remain in Hungary. Besides a short period (some weeks) during 
which their (relatively restricted) presence was noticeable, the ‘migration-threat’ 
emphasised by the government appeared as relatively imaginary to major segments of the 
population. This absence of migrants was probably one of the main factors that limited the 
effectiveness of the ‘migration-narrative’ and which contributed to the low turnout for the 
government-initiated referendum on the topic. 
Finally, some remarks about the differences between the American and the Hungarian case. In 
the 1997 introduction to his book, Skowronek states that it offers ‘an analysis of the leadership 
patterns that are repeatedly produced through the American constitutional system by the 
peculiar structure and operation of its presidential office. In this sense, it is about the politics 
that the American presidency makes.’ (Skowronek, 1997: xvi – emphasis in original) This 
framing indicates that the recurrent patterns of the presidency, and the four fundamental roles 
– including reconstructive leadership – should be interpreted within a relatively fixed 
constitutional settlement. Although presidents can significantly widen their opportunities by 
reinterpreting these rules, they cannot fundamentally rewrite those rules and are thus required 
to operate within the given constitutional framework. Here lies the main difference with the 
Hungarian case, in which a political leader, by acquiring a supermajority in parliament, secured 
himself a place outside that settlement. The fact that obstacles constraining the leader’s 
voluntarism are different follows from this fact. Consequently, the ‘thickening’ of the 
institutional context (the emergence of new veto players with the advent of the welfare state) 
that brings about the ‘waning of political time’ (the declining importance of the leader of the 
executive in political change) does not apply to the Hungarian case. In the latter, we can rather 
speak of the institutional context getting ‘thinner’. By getting a ‘quasi-superweapon’ 
(parliamentary supermajority) to eliminate almost any of the opposing institutions (except for 
the supranational players mentioned), Orbán did not face strong veto players that would have 
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opposed the changes he had initiated. Therefore, in the Hungarian context a more voluntaristic 
reconstructive leadership could be realised than in the American context (Laing, 2012; Nichols, 
2014, 2015). 
Through these differences we arrive at a new and broader concept of reconstructive leadership 
than that posited by Skowronek. In this new concept, traditional institutional conflicts (conflicts 
between formal institutions), although not absent, lose their primacy to ideational conflicts and 
contests about meaning in which political agents may play a more formative role, but are still 
constrained by popular preferences and widely held ideas. Of course, the mechanisms of these 
ideational struggles require further elaboration than we have opportunity for in this paper. 
However, this Hungarian case analysis opens the door to a modified view of reconstruction 
more in line with contemporary constructivist and ideational approaches than the original 
Skowronekian view. 
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Notes 
1 Skowronek, in his answer to Hoekstra’s critique (Skowronek 1999) may be attempting to balance between the 
constructivist and structuralist (or positivist) viewpoints. However, in our view, his position remains somewhat 
ambivalent. 
2 Policy paradigms (Hall, 1993) and policy discourse can be considered components of Skowronek’s broad 
conception of ‘regime’. 
3 ‘Orthodox’ not in the sense of conforming to an economic theory, but rather in the sense of conforming to the 
best practise that is recommended by economic authorities. We use ‘orthodox’ here in the sense Dequech uses the 
term ‘mainstream’ (2012: 354–355). 
4 The referendum question was: ‘Do you want the European Union to be able to mandate the obligatory 
resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary even without the approval of the National Assembly?’ 
Turnout was only 44.04%, which did not reach the threshold for validity of 50%. 98.36% of participants rejected 
the EU’s quota proposal (National Election Office, 2016). 
5 See Orbán’s vision on common identity in his interview (Köppel and Koydl, 2015). 
6 On 22 February 2015, after by-elections in two single-member constituencies, Orbán lost his supermajority in 
Hungarian parliament, hence his governing party needed external support to pass constitutional amendments. 
7 Between 2014 and 2016 Standard Eurobarometer reports indicate an increase in the proportion of people who 
considered migration to be one of the two most important issues facing Hungary. In the autumn of 2015, a clear 
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majority of Hungarians (68%) found migration the single most important issue facing the EU (European 
Commission, 2016). 
8 According to Eurobarometer, between 2015 and 2016 trust in the EU declined from 56% to 41%. During the 
same period, positive attitudes towards the EU also decreased from 43% to 33% (European Commission, 2016). 
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